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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment 
in favor of Hood Corporation on the issue of alter ego ? 
2. Should the District Court have reconsidered the Summary 
Judgment granted in favor of Hood Corporation on the issue of 
alter ego and allowed SLCC to amend its Complaint in view of the 
substantial undisputed facts indicating that Hood Corporation is 
the alter ego of James Constructors ? 
3. Did the District Court err in holding Salt Lake City 
Corporation to a higher standard in judicial proceedings than 
other parties ? 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Following is the text of Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is discussed at length in Point II of the 
Argument below. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether it was a claim, counterclaim, 
crossclaim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved the court may direct entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of 
the claims or parties only upon an expressed 
determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a public construction contract 
between Salt Lake City Corporation ("SLCC") and James 
Constructors ("James") for the construction of a pipeline project 
known as Contract No. 35-4184, Big Cottonwood Conduit Extension-
Terminal Park Transmission Pipeline ("The Project"). This matter 
was originally handled for SLCC by the Salt Lake City Attorney's 
office. In March of 1986, however, SLCC requested that Wilford 
A. Beesley, Esq., of the law firm of Beesley & Fairclough, make 
his appearance and represent SLCC in this matter. 
The case centers on excessive settlement of the backfill in 
the trench line, damage to the installed pipe, underground 
utilities (sewer, gas and telephone lines, water service lines, 
etc.), and other improvements. Generally, SLCC seeks to recover 
from James and Hood Corporation ("Hood") for the costs of 
remedying these defects. James contends that the project defects 
were SLCC's responsibility and that it was wrongfully terminated 
from the project. The Complaint of SLCC alleged that defendant 
Hood was liable for remedial costs resulting from the project 
defects based upon SLCC's reliance upon Hood's promotional 
literature submitted during the bid selection process. SLCC also 
contends that Hood is the alter ego of James and any liability of 
James is imputed to Hood. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On August 21, 1985, the Court granted Hood's Motion for 
Summary Judgment with respect to SLCC's claims against Hood. (R. 
2 
162-63) . The Court, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, stated that "no factual issues have been raised" by SLCC 
with respect to its alter ego claim. (R. 165-66) 
After substituted counsel made their appearance, SLCC moved 
for reconsideration of the Summary Judgment and for leave to 
amend its Complaint to plead its alter ego claim. (R. 223-24) 
SLCC argued that if the court had considered the alter ego theory 
on its merits, material issues of fact and undisputed facts 
supporting the alter ego claim precluded summary judgment. (R. 
227-49) . SLCC also argued, inter alia, that the alter ego claim 
was not a proper subject for decision as it had never been 
pleaded in its Complaint and moved for Leave to Amend its 
Complaint to plead alter ego. 
The Court refused to review the merits of SLCC's alter ego 
claim, (R. 299, 302, 303), stating that it had "fully 
considered" the alter ego issue when Hood moved for summary 
judgment, that it was not in the interests of justice to consider 
the matter again, and that to do so would prejudice Hood. (R. 
302-304) The District Court also held that SLCC's Complaint was 
sufficient to raise the alter ego issue and that it was properly 
before the Court at the prior hearing of Hood's motion. (R. 304). 
The District Court further ruled, as a matter of law, that SLCC 
is held to a higher standard than other parties to judicial 
proceedings, thereby increasing its burden otherwise normally 
applicable in such matters. (R. 304). 
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The District Court's decisions with respect to Hood's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and SLCC's Motion to Reconsider were 
thereafter certified for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil 
Procedure.(R. 299, 303, 304). Jurisdiction of this matter is 
conferred upon the Supreme Court by Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-
2(3)(i) (Cumm. Supp. 1986). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following undisputed facts bear upon SLCC's alter ego 
claim: 
1. SLCC contracted with James, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Hood, for the construction of the pipe-line project. (Lauhlere 
dep., p. 7; R. 366). 
2. James submitted Hood promotional literature and 
financial statements to SLCC for consideration during the process 
of deciding whether to award the project to James Constructors. 
(Foreman Dep., pp. 45 - 47; Dep. Exhibit "3"; R. 365). 
3. Hood owns 100% of the stock of James Constructors. 
(Laulhere Dep., p. 7; R. 366). 
4. Hood installed James Foreman, one of its long time 
employees, as General Manager and Vice-President of James prior 
to Hood's acquisition of 100% of the stock in said entity. 
During this same period of time Foreman was an employee and 
representative of Hood. (Laulhere Dep., p. 11, R. 366; Foreman 
Dep. p. 7; R. 3 65). 
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5. After Hood acquired 100% of the stock of James, it then 
placed Foreman as President of James. Hood admitted that this 
action may have been taken directly by Hood's Board of Directors. 
(Laulhere Dep., p. 12; R. 366). 
6. James kept no separate or formal minutes of any meetings 
of its Board of Directors. (James' Answers to Salt Lake City's 
First Set of Interrogatories, No. 77). 
7. Foreman was an employee of Hood for several years prior 
to his placement with James by Hood (James Foreman Dep., pp. 5-6; 
R. 365). 
8. When Hood placed Foreman with James, Foreman did not 
sever his ties with Hood but rather was acting as the 
representative of Hood and was paid his salary by Hood. (Foreman 
Dep., p. 7; R. 365). 
9. Hood advanced funds to James without any repayment 
provisions or security. These advancements were not loans. 
(Laulhere Dep., p. 17; R. 366). 
10. Hood also guaranteed loans made by third-parties to 
James, including one in an approximate amount of $300,000.00 from 
First Security Bank. (Laulhere Dep., p. 18; R. 366). 
11. No security was ever provided by James for money 
advanced or the loans guaranteed by Hood. (Laulhere Dep., p. 34; 
R. 366). 
12. Industrial Indemnity, Hood's bonding company, also 
bonded James on its Projects. (Foreman Dep., p. 10; R. 365). 
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13. Industrial Indemnity, when bonding James1 projects, 
relied upon Hood's financial information and strength and did not 
ask for financial statements from James. (Ken Evans Dep., pp. 8, 
9, 14, 15; R. 362). 
14. Industrial Indemnity's arrangement in bonding James was 
to consider the financial position of Hood and its subsidiaries 
as one single account. (Ken Evans Dep., pp.14, 15 & 32; R. 362). 
15. The President of Hood Corporation, Marc Laulhere, 
signed Jame's Indemnity Contract as President of Hood. (Evans 
Dep., p. 18; R. 362). 
16. When Staker Paving brought a claim against James on the 
Salt Lake City Pipe Line Project, Marc Laulhere, President of 
Hood, rather than James' personnel, dealt directly with the 
bonding company, Industrial Indemnity, with respect to the claim 
against James. (Evans Dep., p. 23; R. 362). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
SLCC contends that the District Court erred in granting Hood 
summary judgment on the alter ego issue in view of the issues of 
fact and undisputed facts supporting that claim. The Court 
stated that it had "fully considered" the issue, (R. 3 04) , and 
that no issue of fact was present relative to the alter ego 
claim. (R. 165-166). The facts set forth above, however, refute 
the Finding of the District Court and establish Hood as the alter 
ego of James. The District Court erred, therefore, in granting 
Hood's Summary Judgment inasmuch as material issues of fact exist 
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relative to the alter ego claim and Hood is not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
SLCC further contends that the District Court erred in 
treating the Summary Judgment as a final judgment and refusing to 
review and revise the interlocutory decision as requested under 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If the Court had 
fully considered, at the first hearing, all the above facts 
bearing upon the alter ego issue, then it erred in granting 
summary judgment. If, on the other hand, any of the above facts 
were not considered at the first hearing, then the Court erred in 
refusing to review its decision when notified by SLCC of such 
facts. Under Rule 54(b), the interlocutory determination of the 
District Court was not a final judgment and was subject to review 
and revision. 
Furthermore, the District Court erred in holding SLCC to a 
higher standard in these proceedings than the law required. SLCC 
was prejudiced in this respect in that its arguments and claims 
were not considered under the appropriate standards. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING HOOD'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF ALTER EGO. 
This Court has consistently held that on appeal from a 
summary judgment, this court will view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the losing party. Geneva Pipe Company v. S & H 
Insurance Company, 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). Furthermore, 
because of the drastic and harsh nature of summary judgment, "the 
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Court should be reluctant to deprive litigants of an opportunity 
to fully present their contentions upon a trial." Welchman v. 
Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.2d 410 (1959). 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that summary judgment cannot be granted where there exists a 
genuine issue of fact. Summary judgment is clearly improper, 
therefore, where, as in this case, material issues of fact are 
present. Geneva Pipe Company v. S & H Ins. Co. , 714 P.2d 648 
(Utah 1986); Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985); 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 
(1984). 
A. Genuine and Material Issues of Fact Exist as to Alter Ego 
The very nature of an alter ego claim raises issues of fact 
and precludes the entry of summary judgment. In Amiacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates. 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981), 
this Court reversed a summary judgment dismissing a claim of 
alter ego. Finding that summary judgment with respect to the 
alter ego claim was improper, the Court stated: 
The District Court made no mention of 
plaintiff's alter ego claim in its Order of 
Dismissal, but it is clear that issues of 
fact are raised bv the claim. 
Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
Alter ego is seldom a proper subject for summary judgment in 
view of the doctrine's dependency on the facts and circumstances 
of the individual case: 
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• Moreover, I:l: 1 = conditions ui ider which the 
corporate € .1 „ t: di I: /; may be disregarded or the 
corporation be regarded as the alter ego of 
the stockholders vary according to the 
circumstances in each case inasmuch as the 
doctrine is am equitable - :-~ 
Shaw v, Bailev-McCune Company 1 ' ? m , 155 P. 2d 321, 322 
(196M) "('ho question of ilfer - _ ---^ ilf raises HI issue M| 
tact whicli I!.J in in I | lisposedl ul I liruuqh hummary J tidi fiiieti'll I II 
Plotkin v. Nat mini Lead Company, 482 P.2d " ,' l iilli tda 1971), in 
order grant mi | iiinm 11 ', iiudgment wnr reversed wheie a claim oi 
aJter ego presented a question ct iait. 
Many factual considerations wv involved in determining 
w h e t h P i in iiiiiil HI 11 I r i cqi I i i i m l i| i p r n p i i l i fe iiiiclhi i . w h e t h e r 
(In t.lie p a r e n t c c L p c i a l ion owns a l l n r a major i ty 111" I liu s t u c k ni 
the subsidiary, (*i1 the parent i | ' o r a t i o n 1 inances-i t lie 
s u b s i d i a r r I l| I In |J.J i Pill i ui pel a t I un | j j r i I lit- s a l a r i e s m 
e x p e n s e s o t t h e s u b b i d i c i y , H i I lie funnel J e q a l Lequ i i eme i i t s u) 
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i ui-po ra t i on , F i s h v . E a s t , 1J 4 F ,?d 171 191 ( 1 0 t h C i r c u i t 
I'''I'M f l£tLei.ii.„ JJ . j u n i t e d A u t o . , e t c , ^. c a i d w e l l Miu • . c u I In 
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irpinuiec I hi u n d i s p u t e d p r e s e m e nt i l l t h e above t a c t o r s ; Hood 
owns 100% if 1 f t h e s t o c k in dames (LauJhere Pep , p i, R. mi i 
Hood I in limaiices IILIHIL Ihiiiinjli I mid' nP inn cd I i lames w i t h o u t 
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repayment provisions or security; such advances to James were 
not loans (Laulere Dep., p. 17; R. 366); Hood has also 
guaranteed loans by third parties to James, including one in an 
approximate amount of $300,000.00 (Laulere Dep., p. 18; R. 366); 
no security was ever provided by James for money advanced or the 
loans guaranteed by Hood. (Laulere Dep., p. 34; R. 366). 
When Hood Corporation negotiated to acquire James, it 
installed James Foreman, a long time Hood employee, with James. 
(James Foreman dep., pp. 5-6; R.365). Foreman, however, did not 
sever his ties with Hood but continued to act as a representative 
of Hood and was paid his salary by Hood (Foreman dep., p. 7; R. 
365). With respect to corporate formalities, James kept no 
formal minutes of any meetings of its Board of Directors. (James 
Answers to SLCC's first set of Interrogatories No. 77). 
The above Statement of Facts demonstrates that the directors 
and officers of James did not act independently in the interest 
of the subsidiary James, but rather were directed by the parent 
corporation, Hood. These undisputed facts create an issue of 
fact as to whether Hood is the alter ego of James. It is clear, 
therefore, that summary judgment for Hood was improper and the 
District Court's decision should be reversed. 
B. Hood was not Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Alter Ego 
Issue as a Matter of Law. 
Assuming, arguendo, the non-existence of any material issue 
of fact, summary judgment is nevertheless proper only where the 
moving party has made a "showing which precludes, as a matter of 
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most f a v o r a b l e t n Si, , I i< \ r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t M 
may p r e v a i l iiii I In i i l l e i HIJU | ' , , U H in K M ] il y, 1 IIWMJ nmli i nut m 1 
f a c t s prepondera te so f a v o r a b l y toward1* d f i n d i n g of a i t e r \\\w 
t h a t summary "judgment wi th i e s p e c t In t ho i i l t o r cqn n s u e won id 
h a v e hppri iiiinii u a p p r o p r i a t e iL1.1• 1111 b 1 linn i nil ni ShCC. 
Summary j u d g m e n t , i IIIIUMI e t o r e , w.ms improper and s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d , 
II INT I I 
THE DISTRICT 001,1 RT ERRED IN P E I"'IJS IMG TO REV IS E ITS 
INTERLOCUTOR1 "r nr-'CISION REGARDING SLCC'S CLAIM OF M TEP 
EGO. 
Subsequent to the appearance of S^L -* * .i- * ~ * M I « M I -P^ >-
SLCCr SLCC moved the District Court , . 
Rules ol Livil Procedure 1 111 i ev i i1. 11 n i i ~egard -
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the Court tn review the alter ego decision as provided under Rule 
•11 (!»• i i Hill1 i null i in*! I Ii ' I ' " i " i ?'* i n,iii M I I IIIIDII I i n a l a m i ill 111 in ill 
terminated i " awsu 11 as to Hood ... " Ii*. J i n ,-.jM lain. The 
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alter ego claim, as the subject of an interlocutory decision, was 
subject to the same principles governing summary judgment, and 
the Court should have viewed the evidence presented by SLCC in a 
light most favorable to SLCC. Notwithstanding Rule 54(b), the 
Court apparently treated the decision as a final judgment and 
refused to review the merits of the alter ego claim. 
Under Rule 54(b), the District Court's interlocutory summary 
judgment was not a final decision. The lawsuit was not 
terminated as to either Hood or the alter ego claim, absent a 
Rule 54(b) certification and entry of final judgment. Rule 54(b) 
provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether it was a claim, counterclaim, 
crossclaim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved the court may direct entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of 
the claims or parties only upon an expressed 
determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis 
added). 
In this case there are multiple parties (Hood, James, Industrial 
Indemnity), and the District Court's decision involved only one 
of those parties (Hood). Therefore, the Summary Judgment in 
favor of Hood was not a final judgment and was subject to 
12 
rev i s ion , Neider v» Sta te Department of Transportat ion, 6 65 P.2d 
I n i G ( H I ciillli I i I ' . 
Rule ')4 (b) makes clear that the Summary Judgment did not 
terminate the action as to Hood or the alter ego claim until ni 
I i i i a J d j s i in l b i I i in Il Hi II II I in i I in, I ""•' ' i l l Il Il I"! i m i s i ii irnil i II i i I«"IIII "I r- n | | II i ) 
certification was entered. At, the time the Summary Judgment was 
granted, Hood elected not to request <i Rule 54(b) certification. 
A b s e n t s u c h :iv\"\' nil liuv.it; u r n I hi iiminii , ludijniPii t ill h i mil I e r m i ii.i1 c 
the actimi ,i :i t; Hood ni Shut " ; aitei \ \\ Il mil "The 
Interlocutory decision had no res judicata effect on SLCC - ^ 
Bros, v, American Broadcasting ujmuanieb, 
II "iini,"! i and was subject to revision, Williams v. State, 
806 1111 .1 Il in "I 9R i"i ) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp, v. Martinez, 
I,,11 J;111, 2d ,H I (IJltdih 1 9 8 5 ) . 
The wisdom of Rule 5 4(b) Is «' 'Ident In situations such as 
this case where discovery is still continuina ' s discovery 
progressesr the complexion n: i the case changes and tacts develop 
which mi i i impact i ill or locutory decisions iii-ridf i I Ii ii 
I  i s i d e r a II 11111 i II i- n 11 Il i III. i m 1i-m 1" iri I II! i i s i • a s P S T P (" I* m ri s m mi n a inn i-i< i" P ? • t •»c 1 
discovi mi | requests regarding the issue :»t aitei | "'III1,!'! ii s 
discovery has been objected to based upon the Court's decision. 
I Hi id*' I I In in i i 'inn' 11 iiii c , .ii Ii iriai I «i n I ie i I i I I .ill! i SSIIIIC such .ii" i 
a l t e r ego LS p rema tu re r e c l u d e s p r o p e r d i s p o s i t i o n of cJaiiiis 
mi t h e i r m e r i t s . riio p o l i c y of f a v o r i n g d e c i s i o n s of c a s e s on 
Uhii. I I I I I I I mi i ill i. I n t e r s t a t e E x c a v a t i n g , I n c . .....v,..,.,,,_ Agla 
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Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), is furthered by the 
provisions of Rule 54(b). 
Rather than treating its decision as interlocutory under 
Rule 54(b), the District Court apparently considered its decision 
as a final judgment having res judicata force and refused to 
review the alter ego issue. The District Court based its refusal 
to review alter ego on factors tantamount to a Rule 60(b) motion 
for relief from final judgments. The lower court ruled that it 
is not in the interest of justice to consider a matter more than 
once, that Hood would be prejudiced if the decision were revised, 
and further held SLCC to higher standards than other parties. (R. 
302-304). 
These factors upon which the Court predicated its decision 
are inapplicable where the lawsuit was not terminated as to Hood 
and the alter ego claim. The decision of the Court was not a 
final judgment and had no res judicata effect. Warner Bros, v. 
American Broadcasting Companies. 720 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
The request of SLCC to review the decision, therefore, was not a 
request to consider for a second time a matter finally determined 
on its merits. Furthermore, Hood could not have been prejudiced 
by the Court's review of the alter ego issue since the lawsuit 
was never terminated as to Hood and Hood elected not to finalize 
the decision by requesting a Rule 54(b) certification. SLCC was 
entitled to have the matter fully considered on its merits when 
it moved for revision of the decision. The denial of SLCC's 
14 
Motion to Reconsider, therefore, should be reversed and remanded 
t: ther pi Dceed :ii i 1 :js ' • • 
POINT T 
T H E D I S T R I C T C 0 U R T E R R E D ±w nujjuING SALT LAKE C m 
CORPORATION TO A HIGHER STANDARD IN THESE PROCEEDINGS 
THAN OTHER PARTIES. 
I'll i Kid 11 Ion to the above d i ucunsed errors, SLCC wau lurther 
prejudiced by I lie inappropriately luyli standards !'J whin In I lie 
lower court held SUH", denying SLC1 I li*j consideration ul ilrs 
i • J ,;j i in,"", il  i| 111 hi in il i, n t i f I  P i i , i in in i i i i o n e 1 u s i o n s 0 1 Ldw 
entered January 1 J „ I ill/ I hi; lustrict Court concluded; 
That because SLCC :i s a go vernment entity, :i t 
should be held to a higher standard of 
performance inasmuch as it has vast resources 
to draw from i n pursuing a legal action 
against a private entity, 
(R 3 04), This conclusion is contrary to established principles 
::  ::!: ] a\ r. ' • 
It i s we] ] estafo] i shed that when governmental entities 
consent sr agree to participate :1 n 3 it ligation, such entiti es are 
II:1 * e a t e d 1:11» " "•«, 111tv i1 s"i i mi i , 11 f I  i * \ r 11 11 II i i • ::i i I j n: I ::::i :ii :::: :i a I I p rocee fill :ii n js. 
The government, when appearing as a litigant, 
is like a private individual... the State 
having consented to a suit, is now in a 
position of an ordinary litigant to whom the 
rules of civil procedure ordinarily apply. 
State v. Tain i „ "HI IIIPW Mexico 2 76, 430 P.2d 773, " /n")67) 
In Bank Line v, United States, 163 F.2d 13 3 (2nd circuit 
I'll'I i Mi'-1 Court similarly s ta ted: 
the pol icy of the American as 
well he Engl ish courts tc ti: e at the 
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government when appearing as a litigant like 
any private individual. 
Many other jurisdictions have held that a governmental entity 
participating in judicial proceedings occupies the same position 
as any other litigant. Campbell Building. Co. v. State Road 
Commission, 70 P.2d 857, (Utah 1937); Alpert v. Commonwealth, 258 
N.E.2d 755 (Mass. 1970); State v. Jasco Aluminum Products Corp., 
421 S.W.2d 409 (Texas 1967); Lyon & Sons v. N.C. State Bd. of 
Ed. , 238 N.C. 24, 76 S.E.2d 553 (1953); Commonwealth v. Bowman, 
267 Kty. 50, 100 S.W.2d 801 (1937). 
In view of the Court's ruling that SLCC was to be held to a 
higher standard than other parties, it appears that the Court 
failed to apply the appropriate standards discussed above 
relative to summary judgments. When SLCC moved for 
reconsideration, the lower court continued to hold SLCC to an 
inappropriately high standard. At that hearing, the Court 
refused to even consider the alter ego claim and the evidence of 
material issues of fact which should have precluded summary 
judgment. Furthermore, the Court abused any discretion it had in 
refusing to reconsider the alter ego claim and denying SLCC's 
Motion to Amend when it failed to treat SLCC as any other 
litigant. 
SLCC was obviously prejudiced by the above treatment in the 
District Court. Rather than being on an equal footing with the 
other parties in this litigation, SLCC was disadvantaged in any 
proceedings in this matter and was denied the right normally 
afforded litigants to have its motions, claims and arguments 
16 
c o n s i d e r e . tr: c . t i n g witr. -:t.r.€ t i e s . 
•. .xi s summary idgment .Sxaerea a c c o r d i n g r ^ p e r 
standards as any other litigant. 
•' • • ." CONCLUSION . • •= 
In view of the above,, i t i s manifest that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment :i i: i favor of: Hnod Corporation 
III I in i u e :: f all t: = i: • = :j :: Tl: 1 = 1 :: ; i = i: i i mi I In i I In. i i n r T I i n 
treating its decision regarding alter ego as a final ju I jmenf" -v I 
refusing tn consider the matter on its merits when SLCC mnvml IIIL 
I ei.'fjui.-i.njei. dill lull l"i tj iinJ.ii'j ii I errui i s equally evident \n I h 
respect 'n M"-j IMi-tcict Court holding Salt Lake City Corporation 
f o ii h i qhor ntandard than other part i er. 11 | mi i c i.,11 111 i H e e t i 11 iqs. 
Salt. Lake City Corporation, therefore, respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse the Summary ludrfnuiiit granted in favor of 
C o r p o r a t i o n limn Il IT m n n r l t i n nui i i t e i I  HI I In I 11«11 i in "I i 
further proceedings. 
Dated th is ,  ^ tyM: day of August,- 1987, 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
i n 
ADDENDUM 
1H 
DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for Defendant 
Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., : 
a Nevada corporation, J 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
Defendant. s 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, HOOD 
CORPORATION, a California 
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY:, a 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. C84-2357 
: Judge Judith M. Billings 
The third party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Judith M. Billings, District Judge, on the 2nd day 
of August, 1985, such defendant being represented by their 
attorney of record David A. Reeve, and third party plaintiff 
Salt Lake City Corporation being represented by their 
attorney Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., and the plaintiff and third 
party defendant James Constructors, Inc. being represented 
by their attorney of record C. Reed Brown, The court having 
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, together with third 
party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Marc Laulhere and the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, and 
having reviewed the reply affidavit of Arthur L. Keesler, 
Jr., attorney for Salt Lake City Corporation, and having 
heard arguments from the respective counsel, and based upon 
the motion of third party defendant's attorney, David A. 
Reeve, the court does hereby enter the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
That all causes of action brought by the third party 
plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation against third party 
defendant Hood Corporation are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. Further, both parties hereto are to bear their 
own attorney's fees and costs of court incurred herein. 
DATED this day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS 
District Court Judge 
ARTHUR L. KEESLER, JR. // 
Attorney for Salt Lake' City 
Corporation-^ ^ 
DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for Defendant 
Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., : 
a Nevada corporation, ; 
Plaintiff, : 
VS. ! 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, HOOD 
CORPORATION, a California 
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: Civil No. C84-2857 
: Judge Judith M. Billings 
Third party defendant Hood Corporations Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Judith M. Billings, District Judge, on the 2nd day 
of August, 1985. Third party defendant Hood Corporation 
being represented by their attorney of record David A. Reeve, 
third party plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation being 
represented by their attorney Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., and the 
plaintiff and third party defendant James Constructors, inc. 
being represented by their attorney of record C. Reed Brown* 
The court having reviewed the pleadings on file hereinf 
together with third party defendant Hood Corporation's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Marc 
Laulhere and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
support thereof, and having reviewed the reply affidavit of 
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., attorney for Salt Lake City 
Corporation, and having heard arguments from the respective 
counsel, and being further fully advised in the premises, 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Third party defendant Hood Corporation is entitled 
to a summary judgment as prayed, dismissing all causes of 
action brought by Salt Lake City Corporation against such 
third party defendant. 
2. That the third party plaintiff Salt Lake City 
Corporation has not raised any material fact issues as to the 
alter ego theory of recovery against third party defendant 
Hood Corporation, which would prevent a summary judgment from 
issuing. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court 
does hereby make the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Third party defendant Hood Corporation is granted a 
summary judgment, dismissing all causes of action brought 
by the third party plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation. 
2. That no factual issues have been raised by third 
party plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation to prevent the 
summary judgment from being issued. 
DATED this day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDITH M. BILLINGS 
District Court Judge 
DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for Defendant 
Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
Defendant. j 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
a municipal corporation of : 
the State of Utah, : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a : 
Nvvada corporation; HOOD 
V;;PORATION, a California 
corporation; and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, : 
Defendants. 
i SECOND AMENDED ORDER 
i Civil No. C-84-2857 
: Judge Judith Billings 
Salt Lake City Corporation's (SLCC) Motion for 
Reconsideration and Leave to Amend Their Complaint as to the 
defendant Hood Corporation, came on regularly for hearing on the 
22nd day of December, 1986, before the Honorable Judith Billings, 
District Court Judge. SLCC being represented by their attorneys 
of record, Wilfred A. Beasley and Stanford P. Fitts, the Hood 
Corporation being represented by their attorney of record David 
A. Reeve, James Constructors, Inc. being represented by their 
attorneys of record, Jay Jensen and C. Reed Brown, and Industrial 
Indemnity Company being represented by their attorney of record 
C. Reed Brown. The court having heard the arguments of counsel 
with regard to the procedural aspects of SLCC's motion for 
reconsideration, and having heard arguments with regard to their 
motion for leave to amend their complaint, and having reviewed 
all pleadings and memorandum submitted in support and in 
opposition to said motions, and the court having made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That Salt Lake City Corporation's motion to reconsider, 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), the prior entry of summary judgment 
against the Hood Corporation is denied. 
2. That Salt Lake City Corporation's motion to amend their 
Complaint to add a cause of action under the alter ego theory, 
against the Hood Corporation, is denied. 
3. That the prior Summary Judgment entered on the 21st day 
of August, 1985, in favor of the Hood Corporation, is hereby 
certified and directed by the court to be a final judgment, for 
aopeal purposes, inasmuch as the court makes an express finding 
that there is no reason for delay. 
DATED this day of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDITH BILLINGS 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, this / ) day of 
January, 1987 to the following: 
Wilford A. Beesley 
Stanford P. Fitts 
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation 
310 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
C. Reed Brown 
HINTZE & BROWN 
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc. 
and Industrial Indemnity Company 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Jay Jensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 / ' j 
DAVID A. REEVE #2717 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS E. WEST 
Attorney for Defendant 
Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., : 
Plaintiff, ! 
VS . ! 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. i 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
a municipal corporation of : 
the State of Utah, : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a 
Nevada corporation; HOOD 
CORPORATION, a California 
corporation; and INDUSTRIAL 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: Civil No. C-84-2857 
: Judge Judith Billings 
Salt Lake City Corporation's (SLCC) Motion for 
Reconsideration and Leave to Amend Their Complaint as to the 
defendant Hood Corporation, came on regularly for hearing on the 
22nd day of December, 1986, before the Honorable Judith Billings, 
District Court Judge. SLCC being represented by their attorneys 
of record, Wilfred A. Beasley and Stanford P. Fitts, the Hood 
Corporation being represented by their attorney of record David 
A. Reeve, James Constructors, Inc. being represented by their 
attorneys of record, Jay Jensen and C. Reed Brown, and Industrial 
Indemnity Company being represented by their attorney of record 
C. Reed Brown. The court having heard the arguments of counsel 
with regard to the procedural aspects of SLCC's motion for 
reconsideration, and having heard arguments with regard to their 
motion for leave to amend their complaint, and having reviewed 
all pleadings and memorandum submitted in support of and in 
opposition to said motions, and the court being further fully 
advised in the premises, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the prior summary judgment was granted inasmuch as 
that order was signed on the 21st of August, 1985 and this motion 
was heard on the 22nd of December, 1986. Based on the time 
elapsed, it would be prejudicial to the Hood Corporation if the 
court was to reconsider their prior order. 
2. That discovery has taken place during the period of time 
after the summary judgment was granted and the current motion, 
including the depositions of the following individuals: Tim 
Doxey, November 4, 1985; Milt Winward, November 5, 1985; Elaine 
D. Christensen, January 6, 1986; Sharon Bennett, January 6, 1986; 
Lawrence Allen, November 4, 1985; Larry Christensen, November 5, 
1985; Clyde Bennett, November 5, 1985; and Mark Stanley, November 
5, 1985. 
3. That the court feels it is not proper to reconsider a 
matter which has been argued and resolved on the merits, such 
being the case at hand. 
4. That the alter ego theory of liability raised by SLCC, 
though not mentioned specifically, was pleaded in the Amended 
Complaint of SLCC, based upon the factual allegations between the 
said companies, inasmuch as the Complaint was inartfully drafted, 
and no legal claims specifically were set forth therein, such 
wording can be interpreted to plead the alter ego theory of 
liability. 
5. That the prior <-*ntry of summary judgment, entered on the 
21st day of August, 1985, should be certified as a final 
judgment, for appeal purposes, the court finding there is no just 
reason for delay. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That pursuant to Rule 54(b) the court has the authority 
to reconsider their prior entry of summary judgment in favor of 
the Hood Corporation. 
2. That it is not in the interest of justice that a party 
have more than one day in court concerning the saiuo factual 
issues . 
3. That the alter ego theory of liability raised by SLCC, 
though not mentioned specifically, was pleaded in the Amended 
Complaint of SLCC, based upon the factual allegations between the 
said companies, inasmuch as the Complaint was inartfully drafted, 
and no legal claims specifically were set forth therein, such 
wording can be interpreted to plead the alter ego theory of 
liability. 
4. That the affidavit submitted by the attorney Lor SLCC, 
Arthur Kessler, raised the alter ego theory in detail at the time 
of Hood's initial summary judgment motion, and the court did 
enter summary judgment in behalf of the Hood Corporation, after 
fully considering the alter ego theory of liability inasmuch as 
it was argued as if raised by the pleadings and was fully 
discussed by SLCC's affidavit in their summary judgment argument. 
5. That because SLCC is a government entity, it should be 
held to a higher standard of performance inasmuch as it has vast 
resources to draw from in pursuing a legal action against a 
private entity. Further, SLCC is bound by the actions of the 
counsel they retain and the performance of such counsel. 
6. That the court feels it is not proper to reconsider a 
matter which has been argued and resolved on the merits, such 
being the case at hand. 
7. That SLCC's motion to reconsider the prior entry of 
summary judgment granted in favor of the Hood Corporation is 
denied. 
8. That SLCC's motion to amend their Complaint, to advance 
the the alter theory against the Hood Corporation is denied. 
9. That the prior entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
Hood Corporation, entered on the 21st day of August, 1985, is 
hereby certified as a final judgment, for appeal purposes, the 
court finding there is no just reason for delay. 
DATED this day of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDITH BILLINGS 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, this / ) day of 
January, 1987 to the following: 
Wilford A. Beesley 
Stanford P. Fitts 
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation 
310 Deseret Book Buildinq 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
C. Reed Brown 
HINTZE & BROWN 
Attorney for James Constructors, Inc. 
and Industrial Indemnity Company 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Jay Jensen 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were Hand Delivered this 20th 
day of August, 1987, postage prepaid to the following: 
C. Reed Brown, Esq. 
HINTZE & BROWN 
Attorneys for James Constructors 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
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Jay Jensen, Esq. 
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900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David A. Reeve, Esq. 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Hood Corporation 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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